Secure Observation of Kernel Behavior by Srivastava, Abhinav et al.
Secure Observation of Kernel Behavior
Abhinav Srivastava Kapil Singh Jonathon Giffin
School of Computer Science, Georgia Institute of Technology
{abhinav,ksingh,giffin}@cc.gatech.edu
Abstract
Operating system kernels are difficult to understand and monitor. Hardware virtualization provides a
layer where security tools can observe a kernel, but the gap between operating system abstractions and hard-
ware accesses limits the ability of tools to comprehend the kernel’s activity. Virtual machine introspection
(VMI) builds knowledge of high-level kernel state by directly accessing the memory of an executing ker-
nel. We show that implementations of introspection-based tools unsafely rely on operating system level
data structures to provide meaningful information about a guest. We evade XenAccess, an open source
implementation of introspection developed for Xen. We thend velopWizard, a Xen-based kernel moni-
tor cognizant of the semantic correlation between events ata high-level kernel service interface and events
at a low-level hardware device interface. In contrast to VMI, Wizard trusts no guest OS data, but its se-
mantic understanding still identifies kernel-level attacks that alter the kernel’s execution behavior. Wizard’s
monitoring imposes modest overheads of 0%–25% on guest applic tions.
1 Introduction
Hardware virtualization provides a mechanism to insert sofware beneath an OS kernel, and the developing
commoditization of virtualization [2, 22] makes this mechanism convenient. Security tools implemented in a
hypervisor or VMM [19] are able to monitor the execution of a vulnerable guest kernel executing within a
virtual machine via methods such as virtual machine introspection (VMI) [6]. This design isolates the security
software from untrusted components and reflects a basic premise of research in virtual-machine-based security:
attackers can arbitrarily alter the data, code, and execution of kernels. Any security solution implemented
in-kernel or as an application instead unsafely relies on ker el integrity.
In practice, hypervisor-level software faces the semanticgap between kernel-level operations and the hard-
ware accesses mediated by a hypervisor. VMI-based tools gain high-level knowledge by peering into the
memory state of the monitored guest kernel. This runs counter to the principle of virtualized hardware, and
more significantly, it reintroduces trust of the vulnerablekernel. The design violates the underlying premise of
VM-based security. For example, a public introspection library for Xen [16, 26] expects security-critical data
structures to be located at particular points in memory and to sa isfy critical but unchecked invariants. Attack-
ers can indeed craft kernel attacks that evade detection by breaking assumptions made by the introspection tool
about the guest kernel.
In this paper, we first evade VMI-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and then develop an alternate
hypervisor-level kernel monitoring system that does not rely on the guest kernel’s integrity. We propose a new
tenet for IDS design:systems require an honest view of the monitored object. Relying upon the object to present
an honest portrayal of its own state is insecure. Using the XenAccess introspection library as a case study,
we first determine assumptions made by its implementation with the expectation that attacks violating these
assumptions could evade an IDS built using XenAccess. We then launch attacks against a Linux operating
system running inside a Xen virtual machine and show that these attacks are not detected by a VMM-level
IDS. We study XenAccess due to its public availability, although we expect our attacks against introspection
implementations [6,8,9,16,18] to be general.
We propose a different hypervisor-level security strategy. Rather than looking into guest kernels, we wait
for events to leak out and become visible from outside the virtual machine. We view the kernel as a library
similar to any other library such aslibc. The kernel receives requests for service from userland applic tions
and from hardware, and it executes handlers to complete the requests. A benign kernel will service each
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request in a common, safe way. Kernel-level exploits modifythe functionality of specially-targeted service
routines, and subsequent execution of those routines will differ from the benign operation. Our technique is
then straightforward: we verify that each kernel service handler’s actual execution, as viewed by a hypervisor,
looks like the execution of an unmodified, benign handler. This design is possible only because invocations of
service routines are also visible outside the virtual machine.
We developed an early prototype system, calledWizard, to test our ideas. Our current implementation uses
paravirtualized Xen with a Linux guest kernel. Wizard verifis that kernel-generated hardware accesses are
properly correlated with the higher-level kernel service requests generated by unknown userland applications
running above the kernel. Our aim is to demonstrate that kernel-level attacks change the execution behavior
of kernel service routines in a way detectable to Wizard. Using a keylogger as our test case, we show that
the attack adds functionality to the Linux kernel that is revealed in the kernel’s hardware access patterns. This
positive result suggests that hypervisor-level security tools can be successful without trusting OS-specific kernel
information. As expected, Wizard’s monitoring imposed overheads of 0% to 25% on a variety of CPU-bound
and IO-bound guest applications.
This kernel monitoring strategy offers numerous benefits. Notably, it helps close the semantic gap between
operating systems and hardware that has been problematic for previous hypervisor-level research. We are corre-
lating low level hardware accesses with higher-level interrupts to the kernel. When combined with system-call
characterizations of userland applications, we offer a complete model of the software executing on a computer
system. Our design also limits the reliance of the security tool upon expected memory contents of the guest
kernel. We need to know only the guest OS’ software interruptnumber and the hardware register it uses to
store the specific service requested by software. The modelsar otherwise generic and not tied to particular
knowledge of the guest OS.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• Evidence that attacks can evade intrusion detection systems hat rely on virtual machine introspection
implementations making unsafe assumptions about guest OS sate (Section 4).
• A Xen-level monitoring system called Wizard that securely and efficiently intercepts application-level
and OS-level behaviors (Section 5).
• A discussion of the potential security applications that may be architected using Wizard’s behavioral ob-
servations (Section 6). We have currently implemented one such application, system-call and hardware-
access correspondence, and show that it successfully detects a Linux-based keylogger.
2 Related Work
We consider related work in both offensive attack creation and defensive virtual machine based IDS develop-
ment. Attack creation helps defenders know about offensivetechnologies so that they can develop appropriate
remedies before attackers use those technologies. To this end, researchers have performed various attack stud-
ies to better understand how attackers can evade host-basedsecurity tools. King et al. [11] developed a virtual
machine based rootkit to execute malicious code on the lowest layer on the system. Baliga et al. [1] proposed a
new class of kernel level stealth attacks that cannot be detected by current monitoring approaches. Wurster et
al. [25] maliciously modified an operating system to successfully defeat application-level self-checksumming.
Evasive mimicry attacks [4, 21, 24] against application-leve intrusion detection systems [7, 20] escape detec-
tion by making malicious activity appear normal. These studies showed that security software often relies
upon assumptions that may not be known, and that attackers can esc pe detection with attacks that violate the
assumptions.
We apply this style of attack reasoning to virtual machine introspection. With the increasing popularity
of virtual machine based intrusion detection systems, it has become important to know the environment and
assumptions on which they are founded. Like previous literature, we also assume the perspective of an attacker
who is trying to undetectably execute malicious software. By taking this view, we hope to help defenders
understand and defend against the threat posed by the new class of VMI evasion attacks.
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Figure 1: XenAccess Architecture
On the defensive side, virtual machines are becoming widelyused for a variety of security applications,
including malware analysis [13], honeypots [17], secure file systems [28], and other areas. Garfinkel et al. [6]
proposed virtual machine introspection based intrusion detection systems. They developed a prototype system
named Livewire that enforces security policies on the guestoperating system using a VMM. Payne et al. [16]
created the XenAccess [26] introspection library and then dveloped virtual machine monitoring applications
using the library—these applications are the examples we evade in Section 4. Laureano et al. [12] proposed
intrusion detection techniques using a hosted VMM and builttheir prototype for user-mode Linux. Recently,
Petroni et al. [15] developed state-based control flow integrity (SBCFI) to monitor persistent attacks on a kernel.
Jiang et al. [9] have developed a VMM-based tool to analyze malware from outside the machine, and they used
introspection to construct the semantic view of the virtualm chine. In another work, Jiang et al. [8] used virtual
machines as tamper-resistant honeypots, and they relied onintr spection to understand kernel operation.
Many of these approaches depend on introspection. If the basic premise of attacker-controlled OS kernels
holds true, then the approaches can likely be evaded by a knowledgeable attacker. In contrast, Wizard monitors
a guest operating system’s interaction with the hypervisorand does not peer into memory states that may have
been constructed by an attacker. Wizard is tamper-resistant because it sits inside the trusted virtual machine
and provides an honest view of the system without depending on the guest operating system.
3 Virtual Machine Introspection
Xen [2] is an x86-based virtual machine monitor that runs multiple guest operating systems in virtual machines.
Xen uses two types of virtual machines. There is a single trusted, high-privilege virtual machine called dom0.
Dom0 manages all other VMs and controls the assignment of I/Odevices to other VMs. These other, untrusted
virtual machines are called domU. The Xen hypervisor enforces strict access control among all domains, so
high-privilege code executing in dom0 is isolated from potentially malicious code executing in domU.
Virtual machine introspection is a way of monitoring a virtual machine by executing outside the monitored
machine. This external design maintains strong isolation between the monitoring device and monitored host.
XenAccess [26] is an introspection library developed for the Xen hypervisor that provides functionality to
monitor aspects of domU from dom0. XenAccess is implementedi C as a shared library and uses the external
library provided by Xen namedlibxc. Figure 1 shows the XenAccess architecture, where securitysof ware built
using XenAccess runs inside the trusted virtual machine (dom0) and monitors the untrusted virtual machine
(domU).
The current version of XenAccess provides mechanisms to observe a domU VM’s use of its virtual physical
memory and its virtual disks. Each mechanism provides a VMM-level IDS with opportunities to detect different
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types of attacks against a guest operating system. However,IDSs developed using the two mechanisms rely
upon implicit and unchecked assumptions about guest OS state. We now consider the two XenAccess VMI
mechanisms and the assumptions underlying their correct opration.
3.1 Memory Introspection
The memory introspection library of XenAccess provides security applications executing in dom0 with the
ability to monitor the memory of a domU virtual machine. It works by mapping domU memory pages into
the dom0 address space using functionality provided by the Xen VMM. Tools using the memory introspection
library can first map memory pages of domU and then use guest oprating system semantics to extract mean-
ingful information from the raw memory. Memory introspection is a useful way to detect attacks that try to hide
from traditional intrusion detection systems. For example, rootkits implemented as malicious kernel modules
may modify the results of a module listing so that a user-space IDS would not be aware of the rootkit module’s
presence. Likewise, an attacker may hide the presence of a malicious process by manipulating the results of
a /proc directory listing. By directly inspecting the kernel data sructures used to store active modules and
processes, XenAccess provides security tools with the ability to detect objects hidden from previous IDSs.
3.2 Disk Introspection
XenAccess also provides dom0 with the ability to monitor modifications made to a domU virtual disk. The
disk monitor sets watchpoints on specific directories of domU’s file system, which exists as an image file in
dom0. The monitor tracks four operations: file creation and deletion, and directory creation and deletion. An
IDS in dom0 can use disk introspection to detect attacks thatc nge critical files on the disk. An attacker
unable to manipulate the/proc directory listing by altering the kernel may instead replace /bin/ls with a
trojan version that hides attack processes. The IDS using disk introspection would detect the modification of
the/bin directory to hold the trojanls as a malicious attack.
3.3 Assumptions
The introspection operations provided by XenAccess are clearly useful to dom0 security tools. Unfortunately,
a XenAccess based IDS relies upon unchecked assumptions; ifthe assumptions fail to hold, then the IDS will
silently report incorrect information about domU.
• Integrity of kernel dynamic data structures: XenAccess’s memory introspection based IDS extracts
information about a guest OS’ kernel data structures from raw memory. It assumes that an attacker has
not tampered with these data structures. Under the premise that an adversary has gained complete control
over the system, an attacker can easily violate that assumption.
• Interception of all filesystem operations:XenAccess’s disk monitoring system makes two assumptions.
First, it assumes that all file systems in use by a guest OS are external to the virtual machine and that the
guest cannot create other forms of storage elsewhere in the system. It second assumes that XenAccess has
full access to all the filesystem modifications. An attacker can evade a XenAccess-based IDS by creating
temporary storage inside the virtual machine. We call such an attack anenvironment attack because the
attacker has changed a guest’s working environment by creating new resources not known to XenAccess.
4 Attacks
The philosophy behind VMI-based intrusion detection seemsmismatched with actual implementations of de-
tection systems. Philosophically, researchers develop VMM-level intrusion detection systems (IDSs) given the
basic premise that the operating system running inside the virtual machine may be malicious. Hence, IDSs
instead use introspection to inspect operating system state while remaining safely isolated. However, practical
implementations of introspection tools make unsafe assumptions about the state of the guest operating system.
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To extract meaningful information such as a list of loaded kernel modules or running processes, VMI imple-
mentations assume that the kernel’s dynamic data and environment are not tampered. When an attacker has
complete control over the operating system, they can violate these assumptions and evade detection devices
that depend on the assumptions.
We evaded XenAccess by launching a collection of attacks inside the guest operating system. The set of
attacks contains both old, known attacks and new evasions. The success of the old attacks shows that VMI based
IDS are vulnerable in ways similar to application-level IDSs. This makes sense: a VMI-based IDS beneath an
OS ultimately relies on kernel integrity in ways similar to auser-level IDS running above an OS. Our new
attacks show new threats that exist specifically in the VMI enviro ment. Our purpose is to show that attacks
can easily violate the assumptions relied on by IDSs using XenAccess, and that such attacks go undetected. Our
attacks undetectably hide a kernel module, hide a running process, and add trojan versions of critical software.
4.1 Evasion of Malicious Module Detection
Operating system level attacks may include malicious kernel modules that run with full kernel privilege. For
example, an attacker could install a piece of spyware that watches network traffic as a kernel module. To remain
hidden from traditional user-level intrusion detection systems, the attacker hides the module so that programs
like lsmod fail to detect the module’s presence.
VMI Detection: A XenAccess introspection based IDS finds the list of loaded mo ules in the guest OS.
Linux stores the list of currently-loaded modules as a doubly linked list pointed to by the exported symbol
init module. XenAccess maps the domU memory page containing the data pointed to byinit module into
dom0’s memory space. The IDS then traverses the linked list to ex ract the names of all currently loaded
modules. With prior knowledge of the name of malicious module, the IDS can detect the module by examining
the extracted list of modules.
Attack Description: We evaded the kernel module listing application of XenAccess by creating a rootkit
that hides itself after the kernel loads it into the domU memory. Our rootkit removes itself from the linked list
maintained by the kernel. Our module’s initialization function calls the kernel functionlist del to delete its
node from the module list. This kernel function leaves all module code and data in place, so our rootkit remains
unaffected by the linked list manipulation. The kernel modules list extracted by walking the linked list fails
to include our hidden module, and the IDS using XenAccess would be unable to detect our rootkit’s presence.
This evasion is identical to a common way to evade application-level rootkit detectors.
Assumptions Violated: XenAccess based IDSs rely on the correctness of the module link d list data
structure. The module hiding attack escaped detection by violating the integrity of this data. Relying on
assumptions of data integrity is dangerous when powerful adversaries have complete control over the system.
4.2 Evasion of Malicious Process Detection
Just as an attacker may want to hide a module, he may also want to hide a running process. A userspace
keylogger, worm, or rootkit, for example, normally installs malicious processes. These processes attempt to
hide from userspace security tools. As with modules, Linux stores all running processes in a doubly linked list.
The head of this list is pointed to by the exportedinit task symbol. This list is used for accounting purposes
and commands likeps uses this list to show all the processes running on the system. The kernel maintains a
separate list for scheduling processes to run on the CPU.
VMI Detection: A XenAccess introspection based IDS extracts the list of processes running in domU.
Using the kernel symbolinit task, the IDS iterates across the list of running processes. The IDS then identifies
any malicious process that is part of an attack.
Attack Description: We evaded malicious process detection by launching a rootkit at ack inside the guest
operating system. We implemented a kernel module that takesthe process identifier (pid) of the process to be
hidden as input. It calls the kernel functionREMOVE LINKS with the identified process’ task structure as a
parameter. This function removes the process from the accounting list; the process will still be scheduled for
execution since the scheduler iterates across a different pocess list. To launch our attack, we created a dummy
process inside the virtual machine and noted its pid. We thenloaded our rootkit module and passed it the pid
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of the dummy process. Our module hid the dummy process by removing it from the process accounting linked
list. The process list extracted by the IDS by walking the linked list does not show the hidden process and the
attacker’s process remains hidden inside domU. Again, thiseva ion is identical to the way an attacker might
evade a user-level IDS; using VMI in such a naı̈ve way may not improve an IDS’s design.
Assumptions Violated: A XenAccess introspection based IDS relies on the integrityof the operating
system’s process accounting data structure. With the process hiding attack, we again showed that an attacker
can violate the data integrity assumption and evade security sof ware depending on that assumption.
4.3 Environment Attack
An attack may install a collection of backdoored or trojanedbinaries. These binary programs replace existing
programs likeps or ls and provide malicious user-level functionality. For example, a trojanls may omit
entries of malicious processes when showing a directory listing for /proc.
VMI Detection: XenAccess can detect modifications to critical software. Its virtual disk monitoring allows
an IDS to set watchpoints on any directories present in the domU filesystem, and it then reports all the operations
performed in that directory. For example, if the monitoringapplication sets a watchpoint on/bin, then it can
observe further operations on files inside the/bin directory. Any attempts to replace an existing binary with a
trojaned or backdoored version can easily be caught.
Attack Description: We evaded virtual disk monitoring by creating a 16 MB ramdiskinside the domU
memory. After creation, we formatted the disk, built an ext2file system on it, and mounted it in a directory
unlikely to be watched by an IDS. We created files and directories on the mounted ramdisk filesystem; since the
XenAccess monitoring application was watching the external filesystem operation, it could not detect any of
our operations on the ramdisk. We copied the complete/bin directory to the ramdisk and replacedls with a
trojaned version. We then modified the PATH environment variable so that the ramdisk appeared before/bin
in the search path. As a result, our trojanedls will execute rather than the original.
The attack has a side effect: the mount program adds an entry for newly mounted ramdisk file system in the
/etc/mtab file. If the IDS watches/etc, then it can detect our attack. However, our next attack can hide
this side effect.
Assumptions Violated: This evasion shows that attackers who have complete controlover the guest oper-
ating system can create an arbitrary environment that is notdetected by introspection tools. XenAccess assumes
that it can see all the filesystem operations performed by theguest OS. This attack violated that assumption and
showed that attackers can create entirely new resources, such a the ramdisk, without providing any information
to the VMI system.
4.4 Timing Attack
Attacks may need to create short-lived temporary files. For example, an attacker wanting to create and mount the
ramdisk used in the previous attack may need to copy a script file onto a file system monitored by XenAccess.
Our timing attack shows that attackers can create temporaryfiles that will be undetected by a VMI-based IDS
provided that the lifetime of the files remains short.
VMI Detection: XenAccess’ disk introspection allows a monitoring application inside dom0 to watch file
and directory creation and deletion operations occurring othe domU disk image files. IDSs expect to see all
operations performed against watched files and directories.
Attack Description: Importantly, XenAccess sees actual changes to the virtual disk rather than modi-
fications requested by userspace applications. The kernel buff rs file system changes, and so the effects of
operations performed inside domU are not visible to monitoring applications until the guest kernel performs a
buffer flush. Unless an application explicitly requests a flush by executing thesync system call, the kernel will
simply flush its internal buffers after some pre-configured dlay. This delay provides a window for attacker to
make a change to a watched file or directory, use the altered file system, and then undo the change to restore the
watched directory to its original state.
We launched a timing attack against XenAccess that creates and deletes files before a file system buffer
flush occurs. For our experiment, we used a dom0 monitoring applic tion to set the domU watch point on the
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/tmp directory. Then, in domU, we created a file named/tmp/test and deleted the file before an automated
sync occurred. We then forceably performed thesync operation inside domU. Our disk monitoring application
inside dom0 did not show any activity in the/tmp directory.
Environment attacks become more functional when combined with timing attacks because the side ef-
fects generated by the environment attacks can be hidden. The ramdisk attack’s side-effect of modifying
/etc/mtab file can be avoided. The attacker can install a trojaned mountprogram that does not write to
/etc/mtab, use it to mount the ramdisk, and then delete the trojan mountprogram. Provided that an auto-
mated buffer flush did not occur during those operations, thetemporary trojan program will never be detected
by a disk-monitoring IDS in dom0.
Assumptions Violated: With this attack, we again violated the assumption that XenAccess has a complete
view of all disk activity performed in the guest domain. Notethat the buffer flush interval is user config-
urable. Although XenAccess could require guest kernels to use a short interval, this will adversely affect the
performance of the guest OS without disabling the fundamental timing attack.
4.5 Discussion
With hardware support for virtualization becoming mainstream, it is natural to consider how intrusion detection
systems can benefit from easy access to low software layers ofa computer system. Virtual machine introspec-
tion is not a fundamentally flawed concept; however, VMI-based IDSs can be flawed. VMI-based intrusion
detection systems that rely on weak assumptions can be evaded by knowledgeable attackers. One goal of
this paper is to spread awareness of some dangers affecting implementations of VMI-based IDSs via concrete
attacks, and to suggest design principles that may improve the security of tools using VMI.
When attackers completely control the guest operating system, inferring anything about the OS’ state using
its own data may lead to incorrect information. Implementations of VMI often rely on the untrusted OS to
maintain a consistent, non-manipulated view of its memory state. Hypervisor-level security software hence
requires some mechanism offering anhonest view of the guest OS state, even when the guest OS has been
arbitrarily altered by an attacker. Our prototype system, Wizard, monitors only OS behaviors visible externally,
and makes no assumptions about the state of the OS’ memory.
Alternatively, a VMI-based IDS could rely on the integrity of perating system level structures if it was
able to protect those structures from attack. There are types of kernel data, such as the system call dispatch
table, that should not change during benign kernel execution of the kernel. Xu et al. [27] have developed a
protection strategy that uses the VMM to protect access to memory containing such data. Petroni et al. [14]
have proposed an OS-level system that enforces high-level manually-specified constraints over kernel dynamic
data. We advocate the development of similar approaches at the VMM level.
Other strategies are conceivable, but may have signicant difficulties impeding easy use. If a VMI tool
had some way to verify that its assumptions over kernel stateac ually held, then that verification provides
the evidence necessary to continue using VMI as is done by current software. Checking assumptions may
introduce a undesirable race between attackers and defenders as attackers find new ways to break assumptions.
Yet another design may simply treat a guest OS’ memory as a byte array and then attempt to infer the actual
OS state. At best, this strategy is likely extremely costly;at worst, it is unlikely to succeed.
5 Wizard
Virtualization provides opportunities to develop trustedservices that are both tamper resistant and have a com-
plete view of the system. VMI based IDSs are tamper resistantbut easy to evade because they rely on the
same operating system structures on which host based IDSs depen . In order to provide the honest view of the
system, such IDSs have to be independent of the guest operating system. One way to achieve this goal is to
observe the interaction of the OS and VMM rather than the memory states of the OS.
We developed our prototype system, Wizard, based on this idea. Wizard in its most basic form is a
hypervisor-level monitoring utility. When augmented withdom0 applications, it can provide security services
such as logging or domU intrusion detection. Our current work uses the Xen [2] hypervisor in paravirtualized
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Figure 2: Software virtualization in Xen. Trusted securitysoftware correlates kernel-level requests with
hypervisor-level hardware events.
mode, which requires modifications to the guest Linux operating system run above Xen. We run two virtual
machines: the first executes the untrusted kernel that we wish to protect, and the second runs our trusted security
software. Figure 2 presents our proposed system architecture. A hypervisor-level component of Wizard resides
within Xen and communicates with a dom0-level component viash red memory.
Wizard detects operations of domU that are visible outside the virtual machine. At present, this includes
kernel service requests (system calls) generated by user-lev l applications andVM calls or hypercalls generated
by the guest kernel. Applications executing in the untrusted virtual machine request kernel services by executing
a software interrupt. Xen intercepts this interrupt, notifies the security software that a kernel handler will be
executing, and passes the interrupt to the untrusted guest kernel. A guest kernel accesses hardware by executing
VM calls to request service from Xen. Xen passes these eventsto Wizard’s dom0 component, and applications
within dom0 use the event information to improve domU’s security.
The Xen- and dom0-components of Wizard remain loosely synchro ized over their transmission and receipt
of observed domU events. The in-Xen component allocates andmaintains a memory buffer managed by Xen.
It then shares this memory with the dom0 component by modifying the domain information structure of the
trusted virtual machine. When domU generates an event, a handler i side Xen intercepts the system call or VM
call and then writes the event’s information into the sharedmemory region. To remain performant, Wizard’s
Xen component buffers events until a prespecified number of events have been logged. At that time, Xen sends
a virtual interrupt to dom0 that will be handled by the dom0 comp nent of Wizard. To prevent potential loss of
events due to concurrent domain execution, Wizard’s Xen component blocks the execution of the untrusted vir-
tual machine until dom0 has read all events from the shared memory region. When Wizard’s dom0 component
sends a message to Wizard’s Xen component that the data is processed, Xen resumes the execution of domU.
Wizard records a collection of information. It logs the system calls and VM calls together with their
parameter values and the associated interrupt handler. In order to assign an event to a guest application that
likely generated the behavior, Wizard records the value of the x86 CR3 register at each event. This register
contains the page-table base address and will be unique to a pr cess for the lifetime of that process. Wizard
also records the entry and exit of interrupt handler execution so that it can assign a VM call generated by the
kernel to a particular interrupt handler that caused the execution of that call.
6 Wizard Applications
Applications in dom0 can use the data stream from Wizard to improve the security of the operating system in
domU. We propose two applications: an IDS that detects attacks that alter kernel behavior, and an application
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Figure 4: Deterministic finite automaton descrip-
tion of normal behavior in Figure 3.
such as event logging in a honeypot, could be similarly explored. We have already implemented kernel attack
detection and used it to successfully detect an attack.
6.1 Kernel Attack Detection
Our kernel attack detection application correlates the events at two levels: high-level events at the system call
interface and low-level events at the hypervisor. By correlating events at these interfaces, an IDS built atop
Wizard in dom0 can detect extra behaviors present in kernel system call handler functions. These behaviors
may correspond to hidden kernel-level functionality addedby a rootkit. We show the effectiveness of the
proposed approach by detecting a kernel-level keylogger namedlvtes.
6.1.1 Modeling kernel behavior
To verify the correlation between kernel service requests and the subsequent hardware accesses generated by the
kernel’s handler functions, we require a characterizationof what the correlation should look like during benign
execution. This is anomaly detection, and as a general tool,we are agnostic as to the details of a particular
characterization of normal. Any representation that effectiv ly identifies abnormal event correlations would be
suitable.
Our proof-of-concept Wizard application uses a straightforward and suitable representation. During a train-
ing period, we record the system call requests generated by all running applications and the subsequent VM
calls produced by the kernel. Properly assigning each observed VM call to its generating system call handler
is complex: multiple processes may be blocked inside kernelhandlers, and the kernel can arbitrarily context-
switch among these processes and their handlers. Our tool uses the CR3 register value provided by Wizard as a
process identifier [10]. This allows us to properly group VM calls with system calls—a VM call generated by
the kernel when processX is switched in belongs to the most recent system call generated by processX, even
if there is other intervening execution with other process identifiers.
The training period provides a list of VM call sequences observed when executing a variety of kernel
system call handler functions. Figure 3 lists the VM call sequences observed for theread system call when
typing sentences on the keyboard. We additionally record the first argument to each VM call, as this argument
modifies the semantics of many VM calls. We aggregate these sequences into a single regular expression (or
equivalently, a deterministic finite automaton) per systemcall. Figure 4 shows the automaton representing the
normal behavior ofread from Xen’s perspective.
6.1.2 Enforcing behavioral correspondence
The representation of normal correlations between kernel and h rdware events provides a mechanism to detect
attacks that alter the kernel’s execution. When observing akernel-level event, the dom0 security tool activates
the model of that event. As the tool processes subsequent VM calls, it verifies that the accesses remain consistent
with the model. Just as during the training period, the tool must properly deinterleave hypervisor-level events
corresponding to multiple concurrent processes. The valueof the CR3 register again provides a suitable process
identifier. Any mismatch between hypervisor-level events ad system-call events is anomalous and suggests that
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Figure 5: VM call behavior observed for ther ad kernel service handler after installing the LVTES keylogger.
Each line shows a different observed behavior. Lines in boldface are VM call sequences that fail to correlate
with the higher-level kernel service interface.
6.1.3 Example keylogger: LVTES
A kernel-level keylogger is an attack that evades detectionby security tools trusting a kernel’s integrity. LVTES
(Low Visibility Tool for Electronic Surveillance) [3] is a Linux keylogger that logs keystrokes to a file in
a hidden directory. Many Linux programs retrieve keyboard input from the standard input (stdin) or from
/dev/console by invoking theread system call. In a clean system, the operating system will receiv a
software interrupt from the application and then execute a krnel-level handler function by transferring exe-
cution through the system call dispatch table. Execution ofthe code within the kernel’sys read handler
function may generate one or more hardware accesses. LVTES hooks the system call dispatch table to modify
the processing of keyboard input. It intercepts allread system call requests by overwriting the function pointer
to sys read in the dispatch table with a pointer to a function namedlvtes read contained within the code
body of the LVTES kernel module. This new handler function augments the functionality of the original han-
dler. It first directly calls the original handlersys read so that data is actually read from the appropriate
hardware device. Then, it checks to see if the read is from standard input or/dev/console. If so, it writes
the data read from the keyboard out to a log file by calling the int rnal kernel handler for write operations,
sys write.
We have conducted preliminary testing of the ability of our application to detect attacks. We used version
3.0.3 of Xen with Fedora Core 5 as the guest OS. After buildingthe characterization of expected hardware
operations executed by the Linuxsys read system call handler, we loaded the LVTES keylogging kernel
module. We again typed sentences at the keyboard and used ourWizard application to record the VM calls
generated byread system call requests. The kernel’s behavior with an active keylogger, shown in Figure 5,
deviates significantly from the hardware events correlatedwith read during benign execution.
6.2 Trusted Kernel Module Listing
As a second Wizard application, we propose a tool similar tolsmod that will securely identify modules exe-
cuting in the domU kernel. This application would be tamper resistant because it is isolated from the unsafe
guest operating system and provides an honest view of the syst m as it does not depend on the operating system
data structures.
A userspace application loads a desired kernel module by issuing the commandinsmod. This command
issues a system callsys init module that requests the operating systems to load the kernel module. The
corresponding in-kernel system call handler loads the module into the memory, executes the module’sinit
function, and inserts the module into the linked list of all loaded modules. Immediately before a new mod-
ule gets loaded inside the guest operating system, Wizard intercepts the module loading system call. It then
increments the number of modules loaded inside the guest operating system. Wizard likewise detects module
unloading behavior by intercepting thesys delete module system call.
Wizard can further provide information helpful to detect attacks that try to load modules by subverting
system call dispatch. In addition to monitoring the insertion and removal system calls, the dom0 application
can correlate corresponding VM calls with the system calls in a manner similar to the previous kernel attack
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Operations Workload Size (MB) Normal VM (sec) VM with Wizard (sec) % Overhead
Copy 152 243.30 304.89 25
Transcoding Video 152 950.07 926.97 0
Video Compression 176 382.35 388.90 2
Video Decompression 176 340.37 358.08 5
Kernel Compression 272 395.09 461.83 17
Kernel Decompression 272 356.75 392.90 10
Kernel Compilation 272 432.96 503.44 16
Table 1: Performance measurements. “Normal VM” indicates Xn without Wizard monitoring; “VM with
Wizard” includes monitoring time.
detection. Should an attacker try to load kernel modules by some means other than the standard system calls,
such as by augmenting a different system call to include module loading operations, the correlation would
reveal this anomalous kernel execution.
7 Performance
As a software mechanism intercepting events that may occur at high rates, we expect Wizard’s monitoring to
impact the execution performance of guest applications. Toevaluate the performance impact of Wizard, we
performed detailed experiments. We tested Wizard with CPU intensive, I/O intensive, and mixed workloads.
For all experiments, we used Fedora Core 5 in both dom0 and domU above Xen 3.0.3. Our test hardware was
a modest laptop with an Intel Pentium 4 processor at 2.8 GHz and with 512 MB of memory. We assigned 128
MB of memory to each virtual machine and used a fixed Wizard buffer size inside Xen of 50 events.
First, we tested the performance of I/O-bound workloads inside domU with Wizard fully disabled. We
copied a single 152 MB data file withcp and measured the wall time in domU using the standard UNIXtime
command. We computed the average of 4 rounds of copying. We then performed the same operation with
Wizard enabled and again noted the average time for 4 rounds.Table 1 shows the results of our experiments
in the row Copy. This I/O-bound workload gave Wizard its worst behavior, although even that remains a
manageable 25% slowdown.
Our second experiment tested the performance of Wizard on a CPU-bound workload. Usingffmpeg, we
transcoded the 152 MB video file from AVI format to MPEG formatinside domU. This transcoding operation
is highly CPU intensive. We averaged 4 rounds of transcodingeach with Wizard disabled and enabled. Table 1
shows the results of our CPU bound operation underTranscoding Video. Wizard imposed no overhead on
average; we will discuss the surprising improvement in performance later in this section.
We performed additional experiments on workloads that contained a mix of I/O and CPU operations. We
carried out 5 operations: compression and decompression ofthe single 152 MB video file usingzip and
gunzip, kernel source tree compression and decompression usingtar, gzip, andgunzip, and kernel
compilation. The results are again shown in the Table 1. It isev dent from the measurements that Wizard’s
performance overhead remains usably low.
While performing timing experiments in a guest domain aboveXen, we recorded wide variations in our
measurements for most workloads. This was not an artifact ofWizard—we received varying results both with
Wizard enabled and disabled. Experiments would occasionally and unpredictably produce the unexpected
result of better performance with Wizard enabled than with avanilla Xen. While searching for the cause of this
measurement variability, we discovered that other research rs have faced similar issues with Xen [15]. There
seems to be no solution at present; Petroni et al. indicate theven the Xen developers cannot account for the
timing variations.
We have conducted experiments that test the effect of the shar d memory buffer size used by the Xen- and
dom0-components of Wizard. The results from these experiments are not included here. The unpredictable
timing variations attributable to Xen greatly overwhelmedthe variations that we attempted to induce with
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different buffer sizes. Until a reliable mechanism exists to control Xen’s variability, we expect to be technically
unable to measure the buffer size’s effect.
However, we expect that a higher buffer size would increase the performance because domain switches
would be reduced. However, this increase may lead to scenarios where attacks are detected well after the fact
due to the processing delay.
8 Discussion
As researchers try to reduce a system’s trusted computing base y removing trust from the operating system,
kernel security has become paramount. Given the increasingavailability of commodity computers running
virtual machines, hypervisor-level monitoring of kernel bhavior becomes an important and interesting research
area.
HVMs. Hardware-supported virtual machines (HVM) are now provided by recent commodity desktop pro-
cessors. Fully virtualized hardware does not require a cooperating guest kernel that generates VM calls when
needing access to hardware, so our models correlating OS service requests with VM calls do not characterize
kernel execution on an HVM. Yet, the foundations of the approach remain the same. The hardware events sim-
ply change: rather than receiving explicit VM calls from a guest kernel, the hypervisor instead is interrupted
by the processor when the guest kernel attempts to execute privil ged instructions that access hardware. Our
system would then correlate these privileged instructionswith the higher-level OS operations to understand the
execution of kernel service routines.
Detectable attacks. There are numerous types of attacks against kernels, and we expect our event correlation
strategy to detect different classes of exploits with varying degrees of success. In general, our system will
best detect attacks that create additional filesystem or network operations, as these additional operations are
precisely the types of events that a hypervisor observes. The LVTES keylogger described earlier is this sort
of attack. In contrast, event correlation will work less well for attacks that only manipulate in-memory data
structures or subtract normal behavior.
False alarms. A system operating as we suggest may falsely conclude that events at the hardware interface
are not properly correlated with kernel service requests even though the correlation is legitimate. These false
alarms occur when the models of kernel behavior do not sufficiently capture all normal activity. We have not
yet systematically studied false alarms, but we expect results to echo studies conducted using application-level
intrusion detection systems [5,23].
Future research. Our work attempts to show that a hypervisor can detect kernel-lev exploits by relying on
only a small set of invariants—here, the software interruptcalling convention. Many questions regarding the
suitability of hypervisors for kernel protection remain.
• Does the addition of security algorithms to a hypervisor or trusted virtual machine violate the principle
of a hypervisor as a hardware virtualization layer?
• Hypervisor-level security still relies upon a trusted hypervisor. Can we demonstrate that this trust is
well-founded?
• Can we detect attacks that only manipulate dynamic kernel memory?
As we continue to study alternative strategies for kernel protection, we hope to discover meaningful answers to
questions such as these.
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